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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
an article of wearing apparel, had created an actual belief in the minds of the
consuming public that it was made by or had the editorial approval of the
plaintiff, the trial judge's finding as to what was likely can only be considered as
nothing more than conjecture. Hence, he asserted that "we can guess as well as the
trial judge", since the instant court was not bound by such a finding. See U. S.
v. U. S. Gypsum Co., .... U. S....., 68 S. Ct. 525 (1948) ; Best & Co., Inc. v. Miller,
sufpra.

The dissenting judge's colleagues had stressed the trial judge's statement that the
defendants took the same name as plaintiff "because they saw some advantage to
it, brought to their atention by plaintiff's use of it." (But in this regard it is noteworthy that defendants had chosen and used this name after plaintiff had published his magazine for only five months.) However, Judge Frank believed that
his colleagues, in doing so, had misapplied a correct doctrine:
(a) It has been held that, in a case relating to competitive articles,
where there is room for a reasonable belief that confusion of buyers might
occur (i. e., where that fact on the face of things is within the realm of
the plausible), then evidence that defendants knowingly selected plaintiff's trade-name, with the deliberate intention of benefiting by plaintiff's
public exploitation of it, is enough to prove that confusion is likely.
(b) But such rulings have never been made-in truth they have been
rejected-when, as here, the probability of confusion of source is so slight
as to be virtually incredible.
Hence, Judge Frank concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States
should review this decision on the grounds that in this same circuit the instant
court had denied relief in a similar case, stating that "a plaintiff must make out
an unusually strong case when his trade-name relates to a business and not to any
particular product."
Since the present-day rationale of trade name protection is such actual or
probable confusion of source that will injure or threaten injury to plaintiff's good
will, it would seem only fair that a plaintiff seeking such protection should at all
times be compelled to prove that defendant's merchandise is so inferior that, if
that merchandise in any way deceives the public into associating it with the plaintiff, injury to plaintiff's good reputation would follow. As the instant case illustrates, no limitation of that nature has yet been imposed upon the courts.
The old "limitation" on the trade name doctrine, which makes the courts decline to let the supposed borrower feel its restraining hand when he puts another's
mark on goods which are very remote from any that the owner would be likely
to make or sell, is not enough. The instant case dramatically indicates that the
time has long since arrived when trade name unfair competition law is in need of
another limitation-one which would require the courts to look more critically to
plaintiff's proof of "misled buyers", "confusion of sponsorship", and "injured reputation", and in the absence thereof, in all fairness to give the defendant the benefit
of the doubt.
Walter B. Bieschke

MouoroL
--T-E MovNrG Picrua A rz-TkusT CsEs.-United States v. Paramount Pictures,Inc., et al., 333 U. S ..... 68 S. Ct. 915, (1948). This case involves
a consideration by the Supreme Court of The United States of the guilt of a vast
segment of the nation-wide movie industry of a district court conviction of restraining and monopolizing interstate trade in the distribution and exhibition of
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films. Not only were the violations of the Sherman Act by the largest moving picture film distributors of the country in issue, but a more difficult problem, that of
what to do about the violations, was presented to the Supreme Court for its consideration.
From a reading of the majority opinion in this case written by Mr. Justice
Douglas, it is apparent that the Court had little difficulty in upholding the district
court's finding of many Sherman Act violations then existent in the routine procedures necessary eventually to bring films from the producer's stage to the local
cinema. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in this case, agreed completely with
the majority that the district court should be affirmed in its findings of Sherman
Act violations but could not agree with the majority's view as to what should or
should not be done about these violations.
At the outset, it seems well to point out that Government charges of restraining
and monopolizing trade in the production of films were unconvincing to the District
court and were dropped completely by the Government in this appeal. It was in the
delivery of the film from the producer to the local movie house, the distribution
and exhibition field, that an illegal but exceedingly powerful non-competitive empire had been erected by the defendants contrary to Sections One and Two of the
Sherman Act. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1946).
As a result of the consideration of a vast amount of evidence, both written and
oral, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that the five major national distributors of films and many other distributors
and nation-wide exhibitors (movie house heads) of films had been boldly guilty of
conspiracies to restrain and monopolize trade in movie fims. United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., et al., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. N. Y. 1946) and a statement of facts and conclusions of law for this same case, 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. N. Y.
1947). Because those distributors had a practical monopoly on the distribution of
all good films necessary to the existence of any theater, they had a strangle hold
on the movie industry. These distributor-defendants had acted in concert to reduce movie distribution to a collective rather than a competitive enterprise. By
agreements among themselves and with nation wide theaters dependent upon
them, they were able veritably to dictate the terms upon which a movie would
be licensed for public showings.
A film is never sold to a movie house. The right to exhibit under copyright is
licensed. Through concerted action these defendants incorporated, in all their
licensing agreements with the exhibitors, covenants which fixed minimum prices
for the showing of movies all over the country, an obvious restraint of trade.
It was found that in many instances the distributors had incorporated in their
licenses agreements not to license the same picture to another exhibitor for a length
of time beyond that which was necessary to protect the initial licensee in the
profitable showing of his film. Clearance agreements not to re-license a film within
a certain time in a competitive area, if reasonable, were upheld by the district court
and the Supreme Court as valid. But if the length of time was beyond the scope
and motive of protection of the initial licensee, they were unreasonable restraints of
trade and violative of the public interest in the viewing of a film.
It was found that exhibitor-defendants as well as distributors were guilty of
Sherman Act violations, not only in being parties to the above designated conspiracies in restraint and monopolization of trade but also by operating their theaters
on a collective basis by pooling agreements and joint ownership, thus removing
competition from this field. This nullification of competition in the exhibition field
received severe reproof from the Supreme Court: "Clearer restraints of trade are
difficult to imagine." To add to this collective alliance the distributors had financial and managerial interests in movie house chains and other exhibitors through-
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out the nation, bringing about complete destruction even of the possibility of successful independent competitive film showing in America. All of these findings
were upheld by the Supreme Court..
Further, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings that formula
deals, master agreements and franchises which gave to one licensee or an interlocking few licensees complete control over the showing of all good films in large geographical areas were restraints of trade and monopolistic practises. These specific
charges were also considered in two other cases decided by the Supreme Court on
the same day. United States v. Griffith, 333 U. S ..... , 68 S. Ct. 941 (1948) and
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., v. United States, 333 U. S..... , 68 S. Ct. 947 (1948).
In these cases monopolistic domination of the exhibition field by the defendants,
Griffith and Schine, in their particular geographical area was found to exist. These
two cases were local attempts to correct a segment of the nation-wide empire of
corruption and the destruction of such local monopolies evidences the determination
of the Supreme Court completely to destroy the nation-wide monopoly now in
existence.
In the principal case it was also found that distributors were licensing films only
on the contingency that other films were also accepted (block-booking); that in
some cases double features were mandatory if licenses to films were to be obtained;
that films were licensed before they were viewed by the licensee and that discrimination existed against certain unfavored licensees.
With all the foregoing instances of corruption apparent to the Supreme Court,
it faced the difficult problem of what to do about them. The district court, in its
decree, enjoined the many aforesaid illegal practices, but to enjoin an industry
which exhibited such a propensity for unlawful activities was obviously little protection for the public against recurring similar violations to say nothing of new, future illegal adventures. However, powerful control of the industry remained and
the tendency to exercise this power in an unlawful manner was already proved.
To defeat the possibility of recurring violations the district court decreed that a
procedure be installed whereby all films should be offered for licensing by the distributors to the exhibitors devoid of illegal covenants and in such a manner that
each, whether he be a favored member of a chain or an independent exhibitor,
would have an opportunity to bid competitively for the right to license. The film
should then be granted to the highest responsible bidder. To facilitate compliance
with the competitive bidding decree, the district court recommended-not an order,
but a recommendation-that arbitration boards be set up to insure compliance with
the bidding standards issued by the court. Rejecting this method of remedy chosen
by the district court, Mr. Justice Douglas said, ". . . the provisions for competitive
bidding in these cases promises little in the way of relief against the real evils of the
conspiracy. They implicate the judiciary heavily in the details of business management if supervision is to be effective." By this alteration of the district court's decision, the remedial decree's central arch of correction was removed, necessitating a
remanding of the case to the district court for further curative action. Herein was
the point of departure from the majority for Mr. Justice Frankfurter. In his opinion, the discretionary power of the district court in its choice of remedies could
not be shown to be grossly unsatisfactory and, not being arbitrary or capricious,
he felt it should stand. He would have then upheld the competitive bidding decree
with but one minor exception and affirm the district court's decision.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in remanding this case to the district court, issued no positive pattern for the lower court to follow in devising a proper remedy for the
movie distributor-exhibitors' violations. Yet, the underlying current of his opinion
concerning problems which should be reconsidered by the district court in the
refraining of its decree flows in only one direction and reveals the Supreme Court's
notion of the proper method of correction: The divestiture of the distributor and
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exhibitor interests between each other and among themselves. It was this exact
remedy which the Supreme Court directed to be incorporated in the decrees settling
the Griffith and Schine cases. It was this remedy which the Supreme Court directed to cure the exhibitor chain monopoly situation revealed in United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 65 S. Ct. 254, 89 L. Ed. 160 (1944), another conviction on a local scale of the evils aimed at on a national scale in the
principal case. In the Crescent case Mr. Justice Douglas said that "proclivity in
the past to use that (chain) affiliation for an unlawful end warrants effective assurance that n6 such opportunity will be available in the future." The Crescent,
Griffith and Schine cases were cited in the instant case by Mr. Justice Douglas to
exemplify remedies which have been used to correct the same corruption present in
the case under discussion. Is it not probable, then, that only such complete divesture of monopulistic interests tending to restrain trade is the only adequate remedy in the eyes of the Supreme Court? A decree of such nation-wide divestiture
may well be ordered by the district court at the conclusion of its consideration of
this remanded case.
Thomas Broden

BIMLS AND NOTEs-CONTRACTS RELEASING BANK FROm: LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT
OF CHECK IN SPITE OF THE STOP PAYMENT OrERn.-Speroff v. First Central Trust
Company, ....Ohio St....., 79 N. E. (2d) 119 (1948). In this case it was held that a
stipulation purporting to release the bank from liability for negligence in the observance of the stop payment order is without consideration and void as against public
policy.
The facts are as follows: Action by the plaintiff against the defendant bank to
recover the amount of a check which the plaintiff had drawn on the defendant,
but which the plaintiff later notified the defendant not to pay. However, the defendant later, through inadvertence or oversight, paid the check, and debited the
plaintiff's account. The defendant admitted the drawing of the check and the
notice not to pay, but as a defense alleged that the plaintiff had signed a statement
agreeing not to hold the defendant liable if it should pay the check through inadvertence or oversight.
The question in the case was whether the releasing of the bank from liability
for paying as a result of inadvertence or accident in spite of the stop payment
order, constitutes a valid contract, which is not void as being against public policy.
It was held that the purported release was void for want of consideration and as
being against public policy. The court said:
The defendant bank was aware that a check is simply an order which
may be countermanded and payment forbidden by the drawer any time
before it is actually cashed or accepted and that an order to stop payment
may be oral or in writing so long as it conveys to the bank a definite instruction to that effect. Under the reciprocal rights and obligations inherent in the relationship existing between a bank and its depositors, it was
the duty of the defendant not to pay the check after receiving such an
order from the plaintiff depositor. Hence, when the plaintiff was asked
to sign a statement or release to the effect that the bank would not be
held responsible if it should pay the check through inadvertency, or oversight; this was something new-an element that concededly had not previously existed in their relationship. What benefit or consideration was
received by the plaintiff as the promisor and what detriment was suffered
by the defendant bank as promisee as a result of the new statement or re-

